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VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN NEW MEXICO:
WHO MUST CONSENT?

It is estimated that one million people in the United States undergo voluntary sterilizations each year and that the method is rapidly
gaining popularity as a means of permanent contraception.' Yet, in
New Mexico, many married women and men are effectively barred
from this method of contraception because some doctors and hospitals require not only the consent of the patient for the operation,
but the consent of the patient's spouse as well. 2 When spousal consent is required, it is usually because some doctors and hospitals
think that New Mexico law requires it.3
1. C. & L. Westoff, Sterilization: Why Six Million Have Deliberately Chosen an Ultimate
Form of Contraception, New York Times Magazine, Sept. 29, 1974 at 31.
See also J. McKenzie, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Doctor, the Patientand the United
States Constitution, 25 Fla. L. Rev. 327 (1973). Some of the reasons many seek voluntary
sterilization are the failure rates of other methods of contraception, recent medical disclosures of harmful side effects of other more reliable methods, changing sex roles and
concerns about overpopulation and the economy.
See generally M. Shepard, Female Contraceptive Sterilization, 29 Ob-Gyn Survey 739
(1974); R. Campanella & J. Wolf, Emotional Reaction to Sterilization, 45 Ob-Gyn 331
(1975).
2. An informal survey by the author (April, 1976) of 10 Albuquerque urologists and 40
Albuquerque gynecologists indicated that 100% of the urologists require spousal consent
before they will perform a vasectomy, while 50% of the gynecologists require spousal
consent for tubal ligations.
According to Nancy Ellefson, President of Zero Population Growth of Albuquerque, the
requirement of spousal consent has been recently relaxed in Albuquerque hospitals. In other
parts of the state, however, spousal consent for voluntary sterilization is a strict requirement.
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-3-43 (Repl. 1976). McKenzie, supra note 1. Some physicians
and hospitals may require the consent of the non-patient spouse because they fear that
without it suits may be brought against them for mayhem, assault and battery or loss of
consortium.
See generally J. Mears, Spousal Consent for Voluntary Sterilization, American Civil Liberties Union Publication (1974) and S. Bloom, A Woman's Right to Voluntary Sterilization,
22 Buffalo L. Rev. 291, 296 (1972).
See note 10 infra. In spite of these fears, no doctor in the United States has ever been
convicted or had a judgment against him for performing a voluntary sterilization without
the consent of the patient's spouse. This is due to the fact that the consent of a competent
adult patient has always been considered sufficient at common law. See Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). No cause of action has been found for loss
of consortium (via voluntary sterilization) or loss of a fertile spouse.
Although it is clear that no liability will result if no spousal consent is required, there is a
possibility that patients who claim that the requirement is a violation of their constitutional
rights will win damages against doctors and hospitals who require spousal consent. McCabe
v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
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In this article I will first examine the two confusing New Mexico
statutes in light of the public policy expressed in the Family Planning
Act.4 Secondly, I will discuss the probable unconstitutionality of a
spousal consent requirement for voluntary sterilization as a logical
extension of the right to privacy outlined in Roe v. Wade' and in
some of the cases that have interpreted the decision, primarily
6
Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth.
THE NEW MEXICO STATUTES:
Section 12-3-43 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated states
that:
Any person, otherwise capable of consenting to medical treatment,
sterilizaneed not obtain the consent of his spouse for his voluntary
7
tion if such person has been abandoned by his spouse. (Emphasis
added.)
On the other hand, another New Mexico statute, § 12-34-14, New.
Mexico Statutes Annotated, prohibits any "special qualifications"
for voluntary sterilizations, i.e., any qualifications not required for
other surgical procedures, to wit:
No hospital which permits any operation that results in sterilization
to be performed therein or medical staff of such hospital shall require any person upon whom a sterilization operation is to be performed to meet any special qualifications which are not imposed on8
hospital.
individuals seeking other types of operations in the
(Emphasis added.)
Section 12-3-43 affirms the common law consent requirement for
9
medical treatment, i.e., that the consent of the patient is sufficient,
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-30-1 to -8 (Repl. 1976).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
, 49 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1976). See also Hathaway v. Worcester
, 96 S. Ct.
U.S.
6.
City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (lst Cir. 1973); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1974)
(discussing only the question of mootness); State v. Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260
(1975); Jones v. Smith, 278 So.2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958
(1974).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-3-43 (Repl. 1976).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-34-14 (Repl. 1976).
9. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962): "An adult person, if
he be of sound mind, is considered to have the right to determine for himself whether a
" See Kritzer v. Citron,
recommended treatment or surgery shall be performed upon him ..
101 Cal. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (Cal. App. 1950): a husband brought an action for assault and
battery against a hospital for a physician's performing a sterilization on his wife without his
consent. The case supports the contention that a wife's consent alone is sufficient for her
sterilization. Rosenberg v. Feigin, 119 Cal.2d 783, 260 P.2d 143 (Cal. App. 1953), in a
battery action by a husband to recover for sterilization of his wife without his consent, it
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but does so only when the patient has been abandoned by his or her
spouse.' 0 This section is in conflict with § 12-34-14 which states
that no hospital or any staff member of any hospital can require any
person seeking a voluntary sterilization in that hospital to meet any
special qualifications that are not required for any other operation.
Section 12-34-14 reflects the public policy expressed by the legislature in the Family Planning Act.'
In that Act the legislature
recognized family planning as a "universal human right" and abolished all unnecessary prerequisites for family planning services. 1 2
Section 12-3-43 has been interpreted by some doctors and hospitals
as a spousal consent requirement in spite of the language of
§ 12-34-14 and the policy expressed in the Family Planning Act. It is
this interpretation of the two statutes in question that denies some
married people in New Mexico access to voluntary sterilization as a
method of birth control.
THE COURTS AND DECISIONS RELATED TO FERTILITY CONTROL:
A "PRIVATE" CHOICE?

If the question is presented to the New Mexico courts, it is likely
that they would be guided by the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court as well as some lower federal and state courts
and hold both that decisions related to fertility control fall within a
constitutionally protected right of privacy,' 3 and that states must
was held that the consent of the patient alone is sufficient. Rytkonen v. Lojacono, 269
Mich. 270, 257 N.W. 703 (1934) and Baker v. Heaney, 82 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935), the wife's consent was not required for husband's operation. Herko v. Uviller, 203
Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1952), where husband sought damages for deprivation of further offspring and loss of consortium and society because of an abortion allegedly
performed by defendant, it was held that a wife's participation in the transaction would
preclude her, and consequently her husband, from maintaining the action. See generally 4
A.L.R. 1531 (1919); 61 Am. Jur.2d Physicians and Surgeons § 111, § 152 (1972); 70
C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons, § 48(g) (1951); K. Proctor, Consent to Operative Procedures, 22 Md. L. Rev. 190 (1962).
10. Since the statute does not define "abandonment," the determination of whether or
not abandonment has taken place is another difficult question. The only definition of
abandonment in the New Mexico statutes is found in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-6-2 (Supp.
1975). That statute refers to the crime of abandonment of dependents. The crime is committed by a person, who, having the ability and means to provide for his/her spouse and
minor children's support, fails to do so and leaves them dependent upon public support. It is
clear that this definition of abandonment would restrict voluntary sterilization to only those
married persons dependent on public support because of criminal abandonmen[ and to
those who have secured the consent of their spouses.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-30-1 (Repl. 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-30-3 (Repl. 1976).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-30-3(1) (Repl. 1976) and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-30-5 (Repl.
1976) state that there shall be no prerequisites to family planning except referral by a
physician, any requirement imposed by law, or payment for the service.
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. Accord, Planned Parenthood v. Danford,
U.S.
, 96 S.Ct.
, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1976). Cf. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475
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show a "compelling" interest before they may legislatively invade
that zone of privacy.' Thus, § 12-3-43, if read as a requirement of
spousal consent for voluntary sterilization, would be stricken as an
unconstitutional exercise of state power unless the state could show
a "compelling" interest.
The Supreme Court has been called upon to decide whether and
when the state, the individual or the family unit should have the
ultimate authority to make decisions that may affect all three.' ' The
decision making role has been allocated by balancing the interests of
the state, the family, and the individual against the constitutional

guarantee of freedom from unwarranted governmental intervention. '

6

In deciding who should make the sterilization decision and

under what circumstances, it is necessary to determine what interests
the individual, the spouse, and the state have in the outcome, and
whose interests should dominate.
The Interests of the Individual
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process clause of the
Constitution protects individual rights "implicit in the concept of
The
ordered liberty."' I One such right is the right to privacy.'
protection of the Due Process Clause has been extended to marital
activities,' ' procreation,2 0 contraception, 2 ' family relationships, 2 2
all of
child rearing and education, 2 3 and the abortion decision, 2
which are sufficiently similar to the right of privacy to be deemed
"fundamental" rights.
The Court has held that when a fundamental right is involved the
F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); State v. Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975); McCabe v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. 410 U.S. at 155-156.
15. See note 6 supra and notes 20 and 25 infra.
16. 410 U.S. at 155. See also L. Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1973).
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152. The Court found that the right to privacy is rooted in
the First Amendment (Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1959)); the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9); the Penumbras of the Bill of Rights (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485 (1965)); the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486
(Goldberg, J. concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Griswold does not expressly describe
privacy as a "fundamental" right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
22. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
23. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 401 (1923).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153;see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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state must have a "compelling" interest before that right can be
legislatively diminished. 2 I In Roe v. Wade, the Court found that the
right to privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 2 6 But that right was not
absolute, 2 7 for the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the
woman's life and health and in the "potentiality of human life" of
the fetus.2 8 The Court concluded that these interests were separate
and that each grew in substantiality as the woman approached term
and that at certain points during pregnancy each became compelling.2" Since no "compelling point" is reached until the end of the
first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision during that time is
left to the woman in consultation with her physician. 3" With respect
to the second and third trimester, the Court held that legislative
enactments "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake.""1 The interests of the individual in the
sterilization decision would seem to be similar to those related to the
abortion decision, namely, the interest in preventing the conception,
as opposed to the birth, of an unwanted child.
The Interests of the State
The interests of the state in the sterilization decision may be similar to the state's interest in the abortion decision, i.e., the life and
health of the man or woman who seeks the operative procedure, the
"potentiality of human life" 3 or the capacity to produce new
members of the society, without which the state would cease to exist. The
state may claim that by requiring the consent of the nonpatient
spouse, it seeks to strengthen the family relationship, although it is
not clear that the requirement would aid in achieving that goal or
that the goal is permissible.3
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
26. 410 U.S. at 153.
27. 410 U.S. at 155.
28. 410 U.S. at 162.
29. 410 U.S. at 163.
30. Id.
31. 410 U.S. at 155.
32. 410 U.S. at 162.
33. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
U.S.
, 96 S.Ct.
, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788
(1976). The state claimed that one of its goals was to support mutual decision making
within the family. The Court held that this goal was not a significant enough interest and
that it would not be realized by giving the husband what was essentially a veto power over
his wife's decision to have an abortion. Id. at 806.
Cf Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974): "We are neither prepared to create a right in a husband to have a fertile wife nor to allow recovery for damage
to such a right. We find that the right of a person who is capable of competent consent to
control his own body is paramount." Id. at 304. Eisenstadt v. Barid, 405 U.S. 438, 477

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

The First Circuit applied the Roe rationale to sterilization in Hath34
away v. Worcester City Hospital and did not find a "compelling"
state interest that would allow a ban on access to voluntary sterilization. In striking the hospital's ban on sterilization operations, the
court noted that the issues involved in sterilization were nearly the
same as those involved in abortion:
...[1I t seems, clear, after Roe and Doe, that a fundamental interest
is involved, requiring a compelling rationale to justify permitting
some hospital surgical procedures and banning another involving no
greater risk or demand on staff and facilities. While Roe and Doe
dealt with a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a particular pregnancy, a decision to terminate the possibility of any future
pregnancy would seem to embrace all of the factors deemed important by the Court in Roe.... 35
Thus, the decision to terminate the possibility of any future pregnancy was considered by the court in Hathaway to be as much an
individual decision as the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
The Interest of the Spouse
The rights of the individual to make the sterilization decision must
also be examined in the context of whatever rights, if any, the spouse
may have to join in the decision. Although in Roe the question was
left open as to whose will prevails when there is disagreement within
the family, 3 6 the Court recently resolved that problem in Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth."3
In Danforth the Court held that a state is constitutionally forbidden to require the consent of the husband for his wife's abortion.3 s The Court held that the state could not delegate to the
spouse a veto power over the abortion decision since the state itself is
absolutely prohibited from interfering with that decision during the
first trimester. 9
The Court went on to note that ideally the decision to terminate a
(1972): "Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity ... but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
34. 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally Olshin, Hathaway v. Worcester City
Hospital: The Right to be Sterilized, 47 Temp. L.Q. 403 (1974).
35. 475 F.2d at 705.
36. 410 U.S. at 165, n. 67.
,49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976).
,96 S.Ct.
U.S.
37.
38. 49 L. Ed. 2d at 805.
39. Id.
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pregnancy should be made jointly by both spouses, but that if agreement between the spouses is lacking:
...it is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and
trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and
the marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the husband a
veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at
all. Even if the State had the ability to delegate to the husband a
power it itself could not exercise, it is not at all likely that such
action would further, as the District Court majority phrased it, the
"interest of the state in protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to
the marriage relationship." 392 F.Supp. at 1370.40

The Court further recognized that its decision could be said to
sanction unilateral decision making on the wife's part, but stated that
it is obvious that when a husband and wife disagree, the view of only
one can prevail and that that one should be the wife's because it is
"the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by pregnancy, [and that] as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor. "4 1
Although a spouse may have a legitimate interest in the fertility or
nonfertility of his or her marriage partner, it is likely that that interest will remain an individual or familial interest as distinct from a
4
state enforced interest. 2
If a husband has no right to give or withhold consent for his wife
to have an abortion, it is difficult to imagine a court that would
allow a spouse to determine whether or not his/her spouse would be
allowed to utilize any particular type of constraceptive method.
Since abortion involves the termination of an already existing pregnancy, it is obviously a much more drastic form of fertility control
than any of the existing methods of contraception. If a spouse has no
right to veto a decision to terminate a pregnancy, it follows that a
spouse should have no right to veto the prevention of a pregnancy,
no matter what method is chosen to insure that preventionincluding voluntary sterilization.
Foreshadowing the demise of spousal consent requirements for
voluntary sterilization, a Florida state court stated that the right of
privacy should extend from the first trimester of pregnancy into the
40. 49 L. Ed. 2d at 806.
41. Id.
42. Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302, 304 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); see also note 45
infra: The Court relied on People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194
(1969) and reiterated that the fundamental right to privacy includes a woman's decision
whether or not to bear children and refused to create a right for a husband to have a
child-bearing wife.
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entire preconception period and that the same standards should
apply to pre-conception decisions that apply to post-conception
ones. 43
Finally, if the state could delegate to a spouse the right to veto a
specific form of contraception, it would in a sense be enforcing the
physical and psychological domination of one group of the society
upon another.44
CONCLUSION

A carefully drawn statute would provide the appropriate remedy
to the confusion created by § 12-3-43 and § 12-43-14 by explicitly
releasing physicians and hospitals from civil liability for the performance of voluntary sterilizations without spousal consent. At a minimum, the legislature should repeal the phrase "if such person has
been abandoned by his spouse" from § 12-3-43.
If no legislative action is taken, it is likely that the courts of New
Mexico would follow recent decisions that bar the state's intrusion
into this consitutionally protected area. The scope of privacy as
derived from Roe and Doe and Danforth should be sufficient to
encompass the voluntary sterilization decision. It should follow that
spousal consent requirements for voluntary sterilization, like those
for abortion, would be judicially abolished.
KATHLEEN DAVISON LEBECK

43. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973): "If we were to conclude that a
putative father has the standing to prevent the natural mother from terminating the pregnancy would the putative father have the corresponding standing to compel the termination
of the pregnancy notwithstanding the mother-physician relationship or the considerations
imposed by the state? Could a potential putative father (or for that matter a husband) seek
an injunction to restrain the woman from using contraceptives or compel the woman to bear
children? Such circumstances would seem ludicrous. It is unquestioned that a woman has a
fundamental right to determine whether or not to bear a child ... it would be beyond the
province of logic and reason to suggest that she could be compelled to procreate." Id. at
344.
44. Tribe, supra note 16: "It would, of course, be farfetched to suggest that the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of 'slavery' and 'involuntary servitude' confers upon
women a right to abortion so as to avoid compelled motherhood. But it would be equally
insensitive to the deepest meaning of that charter of emancipation completely to deny its
relevance as a source of guidance in assessing an allocation of roles that embodies the
coercive domination of one group by another." Id. at 40. This argument could be applied to
sterilization.

